The independence of the International Criminal Court in relation to the Security Council is relative. On the one hand, the close relationship between the ICC and UN Security Council diminishes the quality and legitimacy of justice(suspension of the investigation or reversal of the Court's actions by the Council) and the other hand, without their cooperation or without pursuing justice through power-politics(referral of the situation by the Council to the Court), some of the most serious international crimes and their perpetrators would never be tried. The question of the present descriptive-analytical research is how to assess the relationship between a judicial institution and a political institution in the prosecution of international crimes? In response, while evaluating all aspects of the relationship under study, using the functional approach of the Rome Statute, namely establishing peace through punishing perpetrators of international crimes, and the methodological approach, namely interpreting existing legal rules and highlighting the legal relationships between these rules, the research findings show that while the Council can positively activate the jurisdiction of the ICC, it can negatively suspend the ICC's activities; So after twenty-four years since the establishment of the ICC and, consequently, its relationship with the Council, and considering the Council's claim to functional control over the ICC, rationalizing the balance of power in the Security Council and the ICC is more necessary than ever. Limiting the exercise of the veto right and revising the Obligatory abstention rule of Article2(3) of the UN Charter, considering the subject matter of the complaint for UN fact-finding mission, and the possibility of reviewing the legitimacy of the Security Council's interventions in light of the Control Criteria, the latter two of which are subject to amendment to Article17 of the Statute or the adoption of a debatable amendment, have been put forward as suggestions.